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ABSTRACT 
The Allied strategic bombing of Germany during World War II was a significant event in the 
history of Europe. Social representations of this event were investigated at the level of 
individual knowledge. To establish an index of British collective memory for this event, 169 
adults (aged 18–87 years), divided into three generational groups, completed a questionnaire. 
The findings showed a disparity between subjective knowledge and historical actuality across 
all three age groups. A decline in understanding across time also suggests that a large degree 
of social, cultural and institutional forgetting has taken place since 1945 leading to 
misapprehension and widespread inability to comprehend the scale, intensity and 
destructiveness of the campaign. Social representations of the Allied bombing of Germany 
continue to endorse a British narrative that is unable to articulate with any accuracy the 
effects of the campaign on German civilians or British airmen. Representations of this 
historical event appear to be shifting in ways that may eventually lead to an unintended state 
of denial in the future, i.e. that the human consequences of the campaign were rather limited. 
 
The imposing nature of the past on the political and psychological landscape has been 
particularly significant in the 20th century. Two world wars, the Holocaust, the formation of 
the modern state of Israel, the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and the attack on New York 
in 2001 are just some events that continue to reverberate around the world, creating diverse 
waves of volatile memory across generations of people. Although the past no longer exists, 
it does not simply disappear. It is subject to a dynamic process of re-engagement with the 
present, transforming itself into a social and psychological experience that shifts and evolves 
across generations (Hewer & Roberts, 2012). This aptly describes the social representation 
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of history. “Social representations are carriers of collective memory” (Wagoner, 2015, p. 
143) and through a variety of social processes the past is continuously reviewed, adjusted or 
forgotten by existing generations. What remains is actively or passively transmitted to the 
next generation as historical information (from newspapers, radio, television, film, the 
Internet and everyday conversation) and converges on the public to produce a sketch of 
history, which imposes a structural understanding on the present. Moreover, the polyphasic 
nature of these representations becomes apparent when we encounter variable, inconsistent 
and contradictory formulations operating within cultures and individuals (see Jovchelovitch, 
2012). Indeed, where polemical representations exist across groups, counter-memories may 
contradict, challenge, and resist mainstream versions of history. 
Social representations of the past may also include mythical elements. Both 
empirical and ethnographic myths (see Brown, 2005) may feature in the re-narration of the 
past as part of a dynamic social process of collective remembering – an active reconstruction 
of the past that takes place in the present (Wertsch & Roediger, 2008). Collective 
remembering may rationalize aspects of the past for the purposes of identity construction. 
Holding to a particular narrative in the face of contrary evidence is an uncomfortable 
position and may present a threat to identity (see Breakwell, 1986), and when the counter-
evidence is convincing, a loosening of social identity ties may result. On the other hand, 
loyalty to a narrative in the face of counter-evidence is an assertion of group affiliation, 
which endorses and strengthens social identity. 
Such is the power of collective remembering that Wertsch & Roediger (2008, p. 324) 
argue that: “History is willing to change a narrative in order to be loyal to facts, whereas 
collective remembering is willing to change information (even facts) in order to be loyal to a 
narrative.” In this analysis, collective remembering becomes an identity project that is 
intolerant of ambiguity or counter-narrative. In contrast, academic history is argued to be 
more open to new knowledge since historians continually review evidence-based arguments 
in order to present the past in an accurate manner. Wertsch & Roediger (2008) see academic 
history as the study of what actually happened, and maintain that historians employ critical, 
complex and reflective thinking based on primary sources. 
Whether historiography always fits this description or whether history meets the 
criteria of an objective science is a matter of debate. Most national historical narratives seem 
to be the product of selective attention, distortion, and omission (Baumeister & Hastings, 
1997). Indeed, memory shaped by culture ensures that events are viewed through the prism 
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of the collective: a process in which aspects of the past may be understated, fabricated or 
forgotten. This means that the boundary between history and memory may be more porous 
than we imagine and, therefore, it becomes important to interrogate power relations within 
narrative accounts. Whose version of the past prevails and why? We should also be alert to 
metanarratives within historical discourse characterized by the absence of counter-
memories. Brown (2005) describes metanarratives as:  
 
“grand, ideological generalized stories by which societies understand themselves, and 
which are so normative and all-consuming, that individuals in a society are not aware 
of them as constantly re-circulated. Metanarratives only work when they become 
invisible by having no acceptable opposites.” (p. 184) 
 
In the decades following the Second World War, the Allied narrative of “victory over the 
evils of Fascism” had become the definitive moral account throughout the Cold War period 
and beyond. Indeed, the Allied narrative of World War II from 1945–1990 was shielded 
behind the western face of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War and further protected from 
counter-memories within Germany by the power dynamics of victory and defeat. There were 
no alternative accounts of the war. No thought was given to the existence of counter-
memories in the Soviet Union (see Wertsch, 2002) or other parts of the Eastern bloc (see 
also Hewer & Kut, 2010) that emerged to challenge particular aspects of the Allied account 
of WWII. Eventually, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the Soviet Union shortly after, 
provided the psychological and political space for the expression of alternative memories 
from within the Eastern bloc. Even in Germany, after the peaceful unification of East and 
West in 1990, some aspects of World War II were subject to subtle differences of 
interpretation (von Benda-Beckmann, 2011). 
The study of social representations of history helps us to understand identity 
dynamics, which may find significant application in the socio-political world, e.g. 
facilitating reconciliation after conflict. This study examines the British narrative of World 
War II and explores lay understanding of a very specific feature of this period of historic 
violence: The Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign of Germany 1940-45. While the precise 
details of the Allied strategic bombing1 of Germany remain in government archives, the 
                                                 
1 The term “strategic” bombing denotes aerial attacks on an enemy’s capacity to wage war and typically includes the 
destruction of military infrastructure and production, as well as civilian morale and willingness to continue fighting. On the 
other hand, “tactical” bombing concentrates on enemy targets of direct military value, e.g. soldiers, equipment and military 
installations. Strategic bombing is typically conducted over a longer range. 
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cultural memory of this event – subject to social memory processes – might, when 
examined, produce quite a different account.   
 
The Historical Context Of The Study 
The Allied victory over Nazi Germany in May 1945 signalled the approaching end of World 
War II and the beginning of a cultural narrative that would dominate the political and social 
landscape in post-war Britain. For the generation that followed, making sense of this past 
was more difficult than might be thought. War veterans wanted to forget and seldom spoke 
of their experiences, and there was no provision within a national school curriculum to 
formally study these events. The meaning of the Second World War had largely to be 
inferred from information provided by entertainment and more informal channels within the 
family and other social networks. Politically and historically informed explanations were in 
short supply. From this knowledge base, common sense explanations and beliefs about the 
cause of the war, Hitler’s objectives, notions of good and evil, and beliefs about national 
character and moral superiority emerged with considerable political and psychological 
implications. 
Indeed, the transmission of memory of the war in Britain was neither systematic nor 
overly contrived. The main source of information was a routine diet of war films, which 
included propaganda films made during the war (see Thorpe & Pronay, 1980). Most 
emphasised Allied heroism and ingenuity while German forces were depicted as militarily 
powerful, technologically superior, merciless, and terrifying. These films, however, raised a 
troubling question about the British war narrative: how did British forces manage to defeat 
the German war machine after the catastrophic fall of France in 1940 and unsuccessful 
attempts to invade German occupied territories in Norway in 1940 and at Dieppe, France in 
1942. A clearer picture began to emerge with the release of The World at War series 
produced by Thames Television in 1973. These carefully crafted programmes modified the 
narrative by providing historical and political context (e.g., see Douglas-Home & Childs, 
1974) and it gradually became clear that the inference that British forces,2 after “standing 
alone” in 1940, eventually overcame the Wehrmacht with the assistance of the Americans 
was an oversimplification. Two elements in the storyline, in particular, had been 
significantly underplayed. 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
2 This also included troops from the British Empire and free forces from occupied territories. 
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The first recessive element was the contribution of the Soviet Union to Allied victory, 
which incurred a human cost, according to conservative estimates, in the region of 20 
million combatants and civilians. Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union on 22 June 
1941 had clearly shifted the military focus eastward, which reduced the likelihood of a 
German invasion of Britain. This providential development had never been part of the 
British narrative; the Battle of Britain is always presented as the main event that thwarted 
German plans for invasion. Britain’s post-war silence on the contribution of the Soviet 
Union to victory over Germany was understandable given that, between 1947 and 1991, the 
West was embroiled in a Cold War with the Soviet Union. This post-war political reality 
also sharply reduced any enduring memory that Stalin had once been an ally and that British 
resources had been used to support the Soviet war effort. Indeed, the contribution of the 
USSR to Allied victory has become a fading memory in Britain even though Soviet forces 
engaged and defeated the main body of the Wehrmacht (Terraine, 1985). 
The second recessive element in the narrative is the role of Bomber Command. As the 
Second World War came to an end, the British arguably succumbed to “collective amnesia” 
with respect to Bomber Command (Connelly, 2004, p. 257), even though the capacity of 
British and American forces to carry out a bombing campaign remained an important part of 
Cold War dialogue. Bomber Command, of course, was never entirely edited out of the 
narrative, but the issue here is one of emphasis, i.e. what elements are brought to the fore as 
a primary source of explanation of victory. Bomber Command was mentioned in acts of 
commemoration, TV documentary and occasionally in popular culture, but its contribution 
was always tangential to the major events associated with the successful defence of Britain 
and liberation of Europe, namely the role of Fighter Command in the Battle of Britain in 
1940 and the Allied invasion of Normandy on D-Day on June 6th 1944. 
The full extent of its operations was never prominent in public discourse. Indeed, the 
strategic bombing campaign was such a contentious issue that the contribution of Bomber 
Command has been difficult to assimilate into the broadly positive British war narrative 
(Connelly, 2004). While the Blitz narrative in Britain had emphasised the resourcefulness, 
adaptability and resilience of the British people (Furudi, 2007), the Christian nature of this 
mythology – particularly in the form of stoic sacrifice – barred a role for Bomber Command 
because of the moral ambivalence associated with the bombing of Germany (Calder, 1992). 
The destruction of some urban areas on strategic grounds not only positioned the campaign 
as morally and legally dubious, it was also wasteful for all concerned in human and 
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economic terms (Overy, 2013). For example, American bombers razed the historic centre of 
Halberstadt a month before the end of the war and just three days before it was occupied by 
American troops (Neumann, 2009) and many regard the bombing of Dresden as vengeance 
rather than a strategic necessity (e.g., Gottfried, 2007). And when Churchill raised the 
question about the extent of the bombing campaign, Lord Casey of Berwick, a minister in 
the war cabinet, reminded him that “it wasn’t us who started all this” (Grayling, 2007, p. 88) 
and that it was “us or them” – a moral justification that eventually filtered down to the 
population in the post-war years. 
 
The Rationale For The Bombing Campaign 
The Allied strategic bombing campaign waged against Germany should be understood 
within the historical context of the development of bombing as a military strategy. 
Throughout the 20th century, air power played a significant role in almost every major war. 
The main advantage of this strategy is that air assets can be committed iteratively to the fray, 
which avoids the risk of annihilation associated with encounters between armies (Allen, 
2007). In the opening phases of Blitzkrieg in 1940, aerial bombardment played a major role 
in the attacks on Warsaw in September 1939 and Rotterdam in May 1940. The RAF 
responded with an attack on the Ruhr the next day. On 24 August 1940, the Germans 
bombed London and the British retaliated with 81 aircraft seeking industrial targets on the 
outskirts of Berlin (Chandler, 1993). The inaccurate bombing gave the impression to the 
German High Command that the response had been indiscriminate and the retaliatory nature 
of what followed ensured that the bombing campaign escalated. For 57 consecutive nights 
from 9 September 1940, London and other British cities were attacked from the air 
(Friedrich, 2006). 
From the British perspective, defeats in France at Dunkirk (1940) and Dieppe (1942) 
were an indication of Britain’s limited options to wage war against Fortress Europe. It was 
not possible to invade with land forces prior to June 1944 simply because the Wehrmacht 
was too formidable. Churchill had agreed to Stalin’s request in 1942 to open a “second 
front” against the Germans in the West, but he opted to delay this and focused instead on 
attacking the Germans in North Africa, as well as destroying materiel and wearing down the 
German people and their willingness to continue the conflict through aerial bombing 
(Biddle, 2011; Kadera & Morey, 2008). The air assault targeted the full range of Nazi-
occupied Europe. The Luftwaffe killed some 65,000 in Britain (Price, 2009) while the Allied 
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bombing killed about 60,000 in France and destroyed or damaged nearly one fifth of all 
buildings (Knapp, 2007). The air campaign produced five-figure casualties in Germany on 
six occasions: Hamburg, Kassel, Darmstadt, Pforzheim, Swinemünde and Dresden 
(Friedrich, 2006) and the human cost to Bomber Command was a total of 55,573 dead and 
8,403 wounded (Middlebrook & Everitt, 1985) – a 44% death rate (Hitchens, 2015). 
 
Tonnage And Accuracy 
The exact tonnage of bombs dropped by the Allied forces on Germany can never be 
precisely determined, but an initial estimated total for all enemy targets was 1,578,482 tons 
(see Appendix B) (Saunders, 1953; Webster & Frankland, 1961). However, the US Strategic 
Bombing Survey gives totals of 755,531 tons (RAF) and 644,073 tons (USAAF – not just 
US Eighth Air Force). Making adjustments for American “short tons”, which are equivalent 
to 0.922 British Imperial tons or 0.907 metric tons, we can estimate from the USSBS figures 
that a total of 1,290,435 Imperial tons or 1,269,440 metric tons were deployed. Over the 
same period, the Luftwaffe dropped 64,393 tons of bombs on Britain, which was 
approximately 5% of the amount used against Germany.  
Bombing accuracy varied widely. The idea that RAF strategic bombers in 1940 could 
hit small targets in Germany, like oil plants, was “nonsensical” (Liddell Hart, 2011, p. 759). 
In August 1941, the Butt Report, a study based on reconnaissance photographs, concluded 
that 33.3% of aircraft dispatched failed to attack the target. Furthermore, among those that 
did, only 33.3% succeeded in bombing within five miles or 26,400 feet (8,047 metres) 
(Irons, 2009). The accuracy of strategic bombing was generally woeful, with target error 
often measured not in yards, but miles (Biddle, 2011). 
 
What The British Choose To Remember About The Campaign 
Rather than reflecting on the human consequences of the Allied strategic bombing 
campaign, the emphasis since the war has largely been placed on the engineering ingenuity 
of Barnes Wallis, his innovative bouncing bomb, and the skill and daring of Bomber 
Command’s 617 Squadron. Operation Chastise on 16–17 May 1943 involved 19 Lancaster 
aircraft in the attack on the Möhne, Eder and Sorpe dams in the Ruhr. Eight aircraft (42.1%) 
and 53 pilots and aircrew (39.9%) were lost; three people were captured (2.3%). As a result 
of the damage and the deluge that followed, 749 Dutch and Ukrainian forced labourers and 
French and Belgian prisoners of war lost their lives (RAF Museum, 2013) and, although the 
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raid was a propaganda coup (Niemi, 2006), the dams were repaired within a few months. 
The raid was eventually popularised in 1951 in The Dam Busters, a book by Paul Brickhill 
and a film of the same name four years later. The 70th anniversary of the raid in 2013 saw 
the release of a number of biographical and historical publications, as well as attracting tens 
of thousands of people to a “fly past” at the precise location in Britain where the crew 
trained in 1943. The raid was presented as an event involving a small group of courageous 
men and the deployment of an ingenious weapon that was directed not at people, but 
inanimate objects. The human cost of the raid for the people in the region is not considered: 
public memory remains focused on an atypical raid against a “point” target rather than an 
area or a population. Indeed, remembering this event above all else reflects a deep-rooted 
cultural position. The commemoration of this raid over-shadows the main use of RAF 
bombers such as the Lancaster in the strategic bombing of Germany (Lake, 2002); the full 
extent of the bombing of Germany and its human consequences are not considered. 
 
Rationale 
This study sets out to assess the extent to which the Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign 
1940-45 is remembered and understood by British people across three broad generations. 
The purpose of three generational groups is to see how much information has been 
transmitted or lost between generations. What does each generational group know about the 
campaign? What details or generalities have filtered down? To what degree is the scale, 
intensity and human cost of the campaign remembered? The bandings are broadly based on 
(i) the “war generation” – those alive at the time of the war, (ii) their children, and (iii) their 
grandchildren. The study adopts an historical positivist approach, comparing what actually 
happened (documented historical fact and estimates) with lay knowledge. While we do not 
expect people to have a detailed or encyclopedic knowledge of the campaign, we do expect 
them to be able to respond in accord with their knowledge and impressions regarding the 
number of sorties (attacks by single aircraft), cities bombed and civilian deaths. Given the 
military and historical significance of this event, we wish to see whether people fully 
comprehend the degree to which their own nation has harmed others whatever the 
circumstances or justification. 
We acknowledge that social representations should be studied at different levels – a 
combination of micro and macro elements (see Wagner & Hayes, 2005), i.e. the individual 
level of knowledge: what do individuals across generations know? – an inter-individual level 
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that evaluates and organizes knowledge expressed, acquired and adjusted through 
interpersonal communication (an analysis of focus groups and informal conversation) – and 
a cultural level that explores memory “beyond individual cognition” through the study of 
memorials, institutional remembrance and ritual. The present study addresses the way the 
collective past is understood at the individual level. 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were self-identifying British adults (N = 169) aged between 18 and 87 years (M 
= 46.27). 38.5% (n = 65) were male and 61.5% female (n = 104). There were three broad 
generational groups: 75 years and over (10.7%; n = 18), 40–74 years (49.1%; n = 83) and 
18–39 years (40.2%; n = 68). Participants were either working in some capacity 47% (n = 
79), students 30% (n = 51) or retired 20% (n = 34) – no response 3% (n = 3). Participants 
were obtained through social networks (snowballing) in southwest London, Surrey and West 
Sussex in the south of England. 
 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed to assess a basic level of understanding of the Allied 
Strategic Bombing Campaign, which included foundational questions, such as the start and 
duration of World War II from a British perspective. Respondents were then asked to 
comment on their understanding of the political and military rationale for the campaign. The 
questionnaire items were designed to assess the scale, intensity and duration of the 
campaign, i.e. the number of sorties, the nature of targets, the towns and cities targeted, the 
geographical range and extent of the bombing, the number of deaths, the number of aircraft 
and aircrew lost and sources of transmission. These questions would provide a broad outline 
of understanding from which it would be possible to establish an indicative measure of 
British memory for this event over three generations. However, memory in this context is 
not the retention of firsthand experience or recall, but rather the currency of cultural 
knowledge existing at a specific point in time. 
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Analysis 
As well as eliciting qualitative data for illustrative purposes, the questionnaire asked people 
to express their knowledge and impressions in numerical terms. We acknowledge that 
numerical estimation, as an index of collective memory, is a crude measure – and perhaps 
more appropriately described as “collected memory” (see Olick, 1999), i.e. the measurement 
and aggregation of individual memories. We also acknowledge the argument that a 
pervasive but less tangible sense of collective memory operates within the culture outside 
and beyond individual cognition, which involves symbols, artifacts, museums, and deeper 
institutional structures. This study simply represents the first stage in an attempt to 
understand the social representations of this historic event. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to complete a questionnaire with both multiple-choice and free-
writing items, which assessed particular features of the Allied strategic bombing campaign. 
Participants were later debriefed and correct answers provided to them based on standard 
historical texts. 
 
FINDINGS 
Structural Amnesia  
When assessing the precise time and duration of World War II, 63.9% (n = 108) provided 
the correct response; the range (earliest to latest) was 72 years, i.e. from 1914 to 1986. 
Approximately one third of participants were unable to pinpoint the start of the Second 
World War, which raised questions about their ability to formulate an accurate and 
meaningful historical context for the questions that followed. 
 
Table 1. Accurate identification of date and duration of WWII (i.e. 1939-45) by age group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGE 75+ (n = 15)  40-74 (n = 86) 18-39 (n = 68) 
93.3% 84.6% 41.8% 
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The Bombing Of Germany 
Table 2. Estimated number of operational sorties (attacks by single aircraft)  
Sorties % (n) 
0 – 49   1.2 (2) 
50 – 499   4.7 (8) 
500 – 999   7.7 (13)  
 1,000 – 9,999 20.1 (34) 
10,000 – 19,999 10.7 (18) 
20,000 – 49,999 15.4 (26) 
50,000 – 99,999   8.2 (14) 
*100,000 – 500,000 13.0 (22) 
Over 500,000   3.0 (5) 
 No Response 16.0 (27) 
   *Correct estimate 
 
Bomber Command flew 75,851 day and 297,683 night sorties: a total of 373,534 from 101 
operational bases spread across eastern England. The US Eighth Air Force flew 332,904, 
which amounts to 706,438 sorties against Nazi-occupied Europe (Doyle, 2013). A 
conservative estimate would put the number of sorties for Germany alone between 100,000 
and 500,000 but towards the upper end of the range. Participants were asked to select an 
estimate from the categories above. Only 13% (n = 22) provided a correct response; 68% (n 
= 115) underestimated the number of sorties.  
 
The Bombing Of Major Towns And Cities In Germany 
Although most were aware that the bombing of Germany extended to 10 or more cities and 
towns, 36% (n = 61) underestimated the scale of the attack or knew nothing about it. 
Participants were asked to circle or mark all the German towns and cities from the list 
provided below in Table 3 that they knew had been bombed; they were asked not to guess. 
All 70 urban areas were targets of Allied attacks and many of them on multiple occasions, 
e.g. Essen (28 times), Berlin (24) and Cologne (22) (Hastings, 2010). The correct response 
would have been to circle them all. While we acknowledge that responses may have 
reflected a limited knowledge of German geography and/or a tendency towards cognitive 
simplification, we maintain that the widespread nature of the campaign has not filtered down 
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to people. This, however, should not be interpreted as an example of collective narcissism 
(see Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson & Jayawickreme, 2009) since there was a similar 
tendency to underestimate the number of British cities bombed by the Luftwaffe. The issue is 
a lack of historical knowledge. 
 
Table 3. Major German cities and towns identified as known targets – % sample (n) 
 
Berlin 76.3 (129) 
Dresden 56.8 (96) 
Hamburg 50.9 (86) 
Cologne 41.4 (70) 
Munich 40.2 (68) 
Düsseldorf 30.2 (51) 
Frankfurt am Main 30.2 (51) 
Stuttgart 26.6 (45) 
Bremen 24.9 (42) 
Hannover 22.5 (38) 
Nuremburg 22.5 (38)  
Dortmund 21.3 (36)  
Leipzig 20.1 (34)  
Essen 20.1 (34) 
Bonn 17.8 (30) 
Kiel 15.4 (26)  
Potsdam 14.2 (24)  
Bremerhaven 12.4 (21)  
Karlsruhe 8.9 (15) 
Aachen 8.3 (14) 
Lübeck 7.1 (12) 
Mainz 6.5 (11) 
Münster 6.5 (11) 
 
Ten or fewer participants identified Brunswick (10); Osnabrück, Wilhelmshaven and 
Würzburg (9); Duisburg, Kassel, Magdeburg, Rostock and Wiesbaden (8); Emden, Koblenz 
and Mannheim-Ludwigshaven (7); Augsburg (6); Darmstadt, Saarbrücken, Schweinfurt and 
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Stettin (5); Bochum, Chemnitz, Friedrichshafen and Hagen (4); Dessau, Königsberg, 
Krefeld, Mülheim, München-Gladbach and Rheydt, Oberhausen, Solingen and Wuppertal-
Barmen (3); Elberfeld, Freiburg, Gelsenkirchen, Harburg, Hildesheim, Kaiserslautern, Ulm, 
Worms and Wuppertal (2); Hamm, Neuss, Pforzheim, Remscheid, Trier and Witten (1) and 
Giessen, Hanau, Heilbronn and Plauen (0). 
 
Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Memory map of major German cities and towns bombed 
 
The most frequent responses were Berlin, Dresden, Cologne, Munich and Hamburg: major 
cities, which to a large degree are key co-ordinates in the geographical mind-map of 
Germany. In less prominent places, however, there was also much destruction. For example, 
in Pforzheim there were over 20,000 fatalities, among the highest number throughout the 
campaign, but only one participant acknowledged it as an Allied target (0.6%). In addition, 
also “forgotten” among participants were the stories of Giessen, which was “simply swept 
away” (Friedrich, 2006, p. 467); Hanau, which was destroyed in a heavy area attack 
(Richards, 2001); Heilbronn – “a purely civilian massacre” (Friedrich, 2006, p. 294) and 
Plauen, which received about three times as many bombs per square mile as Dresden 
(Schlosser, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
Berlin 
Dresden 
Düsseldorf 
Cologne 
Hamburg 
Munich 
Frankfurt A/Main 
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The Extent Of The Destruction 
Although the destruction of urban areas in Germany was extensive, 75% (n = 127) did not 
respond to this question either because they did not know the answer or because they were 
unable to conceptualise their response in numerical terms. Of those who responded (n = 42), 
the average estimated area of Germany bombed was 36%. For 18 individual German cities, 
however, damage ranged between 33 and 94% (see Appendix A). Thus far, the picture is one 
of considerable knowledge with some important areas of omission. There is no sense from 
the data that the event has been airbrushed from history but, as we shall see, the data are 
littered with significant underestimations. 
 
German Civilian Deaths 
Participants were told that the German bombing campaign of Britain killed approximately 
60,000; they were then asked to quantify the German death toll. No list was provided for this 
exercise: free-responses are represented in clusters (see Table 5). Official estimates of the 
number of German civilians killed vary widely and the precise number will likely never be 
known (Bishop, 2008). In 1962, the German government put the estimate at 593,000 
(Bishop, 2008), which included 75,000 children under 14 years old (Valiunas, 2007). The 
range of 400,000–600,000 was taken as a working total for the purposes of this study. 
 
Table 4: German death toll 
Deaths % (n) 
 10,000 – 60,000   16.6 (28) 
65,000 – 90,000   12.4 (21)  
100,000 -120,000   30.8 (52) 
140,000 – 180,000     5.9 (10) 
200,000 – 250,000     7.7 (13) 
300,000 – 350,000     1.2 (2) 
*400,000–600,000      6.5 (11) 
650,000 – 800,000     1.7 (3) 
1 million     0.6 (1) 
2 – 3 million     1.2 (2) 
No Response   15.4 (26) 
   *Correct estimate 
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Only 11 participants (6.5%) provided an accurate estimate of German civilian deaths and 
15.4% (n = 26) were unable to give an answer. The modal estimate was 100,000 (n = 43), a 
good round number, which likely explains its frequency within a particular range of scores. 
Giving an estimate of British civilian casualties in the original question was deliberate; it 
provided a reference point – a baseline to prevent extreme over and underestimates and it 
allowed us to interpret the scores as a specific response, i.e. what was done to them in 
relation to what was done to us. In the first category, 16.6% believed that Germany 
experienced about the same or fewer civilian deaths; 12.4% (n = 21) took the view that a 
little more was done to them than was done to us; 30.8% estimated that Germany suffered 
up to double the number of civilian casualties inflicted on Britain; 5.9% (n = 10) estimated 
that Germany had between double and up to three times the number of British civilian 
casualties; 7.7% (n = 13) up to four times; 1.2% between five and six times the number of 
British casualties, which was still an underestimate. The six participants (3.5%) who had 
overestimated the number of dead were aged 45 years and over and two had lived through 
the war. There were no overestimates among younger respondents. 
 
Allied Aircraft Destroyed 
The total number of Allied aircraft lost in the strategic air offensive against Germany was 
12,330 (Bomber Command Museum of Canada, 2013). From the list provided (see Table 6), 
13.1% (n = 21) provided a correct estimate and 77.4% (n = 120) underestimated this figure.  
 
Table 5: Allied aircraft destroyed in action  
Aircraft lost % (n) 
0 – 99    3.0 (5) 
100 – 999  23.1 (39) 
1,000 – 3,999  26.6 (45)  
4,000 – 8,000  18.3 (31) 
*Over 8,000  12.4 (21) 
No Response  16.6 (28) 
   *Correct response 
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Allied Aircrew Killed 
There were further underestimates of Allied aircrew lost (81.4%, n = 127). A list was 
provided for this exercise (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Allied aircrew killed in action  
Aircrew lost % (n) 
0 – 99     1.2 (2) 
100 – 999   10.1 (17) 
1,000 – 9,999   32.5 (55)  
10,000 – 19,999   17.2 (29) 
20,000 – 50,000   14.2 (24) 
*Over 50,000     8.8 (15) 
No Response   16.0 (27) 
   *Correct response 
 
Inter-Generational Transmission 
Less than half the sample, 43.2% (n = 73) reported that their parents or grandparents had 
talked to them about the Second World War; 55% (n = 93) had no such conversation and 
three people gave no response. Participants were invited to recount what they had been told 
and the consistent theme was “silence”; that is, the war generation rarely talked about these 
events, although there was a willingness to speak in broad terms about air raids, evacuation 
and rationing. Only 25.4% (n = 43) reported that their relatives or teachers had mentioned 
the bombing of Germany, while 49.7% (n = 84) could not remember anything, and 19.5% (n 
= 33) gave no response. A typical comment was: “Don’t remember them mentioning it” or 
comments that the war was not covered in the school curriculum. As for relatives, one 
participant spoke of his father being “totally against and ashamed of the bombing of 
Dresden” and another, when speaking about his father, said that he “never spoke about his 
involvement in major events – I think he must have seen some horrific things and wanted to 
forget them all”. Another reported: “All my Dad would say is – pray you never know”. 
Other similar comments included: “tended not to say so much”; “My father was on a ship 
which was at Omaha Beach on D-Day but never talked about it”. 
These cases illustrate that, as claimed in the introduction, the inter-generational 
transmission of memory within the family lacked substance, detail and motivation. A small 
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proportion of the sample, 11.8% (n = 20), had family members involved in the Allied 
bombing of Germany, but very little was said to relatives. Some typical comments from 
these respondents were: “My uncle was a tail gunner; he made no other comment other than 
he was part of the bombing sorties”; “He never spoke about it”; “He never discussed what he 
did in the war”; “He never talked about how it felt to drop bombs; we believed he bombed 
Dresden but he never confirmed this”. 
When asked to place the human consequences of the Allied bombing campaign of 
Germany in the context of other major bombings, just less than a third of the sample 
(28.4%; n = 48) erroneously believed that the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in Japan killed more people than the Allied bombing of Germany. The death toll 
from the deployment of the two atomic bombs killed in the region of 214,000 people (BBC 
News, 2013), approximately less than half the number of German civilians killed in the 
Allied bombing. In the textual responses to the questionnaire, the most prominent rationale 
for the bombing campaign was to attack legitimate industrial targets, to dampen morale, and 
for the purposes of retribution and retaliation.  
What follows is a comparative analysis of British memory of the Allied bombing 
across three generations. Approximately 706,000 operational sorties were carried out against 
Nazi-occupied Europe, but precise figures for Germany are not readily available. Adjusted 
estimates for Germany have been made in accord with advice from experts in this field. 
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Figure 2.  
 
 
Intensity of Allied Bombing of Germany (75+ Years): Actual Versus Memory  
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Figure 3.  
 
Intensity of Allied Bombing of Germany (40–74 Years): Actual Versus Memory  
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Figure 4.  
 
 
 
 
Intensity of Allied Bombing of Germany (18–39 Years): Actual Versus Memory 
 
 
The results suggest a decline in knowledge of the Allied bombing campaign over time. Of 
particular interest is the disparity between memory and historical actuality among 
participants aged 75 years and over – people who were alive at the time of the campaign, 
which suggests that the public has never properly apprehended the full extent of the Allied 
bombing campaign. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The findings of this study suggest that – at the level of the individual – a significant amount 
of forgetting (intentional or otherwise) has taken place since 1945. What is more, we 
conclude that there is some initial indication that social representations of the Allied 
bombing campaign are shifting across generational groups and that the incremental 
inaccuracy across three generations is the product of limited or restricted transmission. 
Indeed, many participants were unable with any clarity to comprehend the scale of the 
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bombing campaign against Germany or to weigh accurately the suffering of those affected 
by it. However, what we are describing as individual knowledge or memory here is arguably 
the product of social and cultural processes, which are also responsible for the construction 
and maintenance of identity and the production of idiosyncratic versions of social reality 
(see Hewer & Roberts, 2012). What we conclude then from these data is that post-war 
British culture, for whatever reason, has neglected to provide details of the campaign. 
Whether this is the result of prescriptive forgetting (Connerton, 2008), whereby states on 
both sides of a conflict pursue a policy of forgetting to further social cohesion, or whether 
the data simply reflect a desire to confine this particular feature of historical violence to the 
abyss remains an open question. The data could also be explained as forgetting by 
annulment – the idea that there is simply too much information in circulation for the average 
person to absorb. Most people might assume that this type of detailed military information 
must be stored away somewhere in the archive and, therefore, because it is “always 
retrievable”, “we can afford to forget it” (Connerton, 2008, p. 65). 
Whatever the cause of this predicament, it is worth noting that a degree of institutional 
forgetting was also evident: the researchers had considerable difficulty obtaining precise 
historical data. Many statistics were not available or are in dispute. Since acquiring historical 
data for this study required significant archival and investigative skills, it is not surprising 
that participants in this study were unable to give accurate estimates. For example, Hastings 
(2010, p. 458) points out that the four-volume British Official History of the air war 
provided “not a single appendix giving details or estimates of German civilian casualties.” 
This cultural position has political implications since what is not remembered in a 
cultural sense can never be passed on to subsequent generations. Although a selective 
narrative of events related to war exists in all nations because they want to present a 
favourable image to the world (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Wertsch, 2002), it is 
important not to gloss over the past otherwise future generations may find themselves 
embroiled in controversy. On the other hand, some would argue that the development of a 
restricted narrative for historical violence over three generations is a significant cultural 
achievement (e.g. Meier, 2010) since remembering the past can arouse old hatreds. It 
depends on who is remembering or forgetting and for what purpose. The merits of forgetting 
have to be weighed against the possibility of unintended consequences (Assmann, 2012) and 
while the Allied bombing campaign as a real event is not in question, widespread ignorance 
of its scope or intensity may eventually constitute a form of denial that implies that the 
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human consequences have been exaggerated or that “it was not as intense or widespread as 
German people claim” (see Cohen, 2001). 
To counter this, an alternative approach to history is required which, in full view of the 
data, should move the culture towards a more considered and precise form of remembering. 
History teaching has to go beyond stories of pride, heroism and personal sacrifice. There is 
need to provide the next generation with an open and honest account and appraisal of the 
past, which includes addressing what is uncomfortable, i.e. what we have done to others 
whatever the justification or context. Now that students are acquainted with important 
statistics from the Second World War – that, for example, six million Jews died in the 
Holocaust – it might now be appropriate to add that almost 1.3 million metric tons of 
explosives were dropped on Germany between 1940 and 1945 killing (by conservative 
estimates) over 400,000 German civilians as a result. These issues are delicately balanced as 
each country navigates its way through the troublesome remembering/forgetting terrain.  
The data from this study suggests that memory of the Allied strategic bombing 
campaign among the British public is rather sketchy and in decline. Further research at the 
inter-individual level where knowledge is created, constructed, positioned and reconfigured 
would provide some understanding of warrant or justification; for example, whether the 
action taken by Bomber Command is rationalised or justified post hoc by the discovery of 
concentration camps in 1945. Further research also needs to study cultural artefacts, 
institutional practices, memorials and commemoration rituals. In June 2012, a memorial to 
Bomber Command and the 55,573 British and Commonwealth aircrew lost in the campaign 
was unveiled in London. The decision to memorialise the campaign remains controversial 
and the news was received with predictable disdain in Germany (Crossland, 2012). In 
Britain, over seventy years after the end of the campaign, it is now permissible to remember. 
However, this memory artwork, with its questionable appropriation of heroic architectural 
language, projects a narrative that requires deconstruction (e.g. see Brockmeier, 2002). On 
the grand facia above the six men of Bomber Command on operational duties is Churchill’s 
salute to the campaign: “The Fighters are our salvation, but the Bombers alone provide the 
means of victory” and above the columns, at right angles to this, is the inscription, “This 
memorial also commemorates those of all nations who lost their lives in the bombing of 
1939–1945” [italics ours]. Is this an expression of conciliation or regret? Might this be the 
beginning of further reflection and necessary adjustment to the way in which this particular 
episode of historical violence is remembered? Whatever the intended meaning, the data from 
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this study suggest that the full extent and scale of the bombing of Germany might already be 
rapidly diminishing from public consciousness in Britain. Whether this is a positive 
development or a serious cultural deficiency is a question in the politics of memory that 
future generations in both countries will have to consider. 
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Appendices  
Appendix A Area of Damage to German Cities 
Name of city Area destroyed or damaged (%) 
Wuppertal 94 
Würzburg 89 
Hamburg 75 
Kassel 69 
Düsseldorf 64 
Mannheim 64 
Cologne 61 
Bremen 60 
Hannover 60 
Dresden 59 
Dortmund 54 
Frankfurt am Main 52 
Nuremberg 51 
Essen 50 
Duisburg 48 
Stuttgart 46 
Munich 42 
Berlin 33 
  
Adapted from World War II in numbers by P. Doyle, (2013, pp. 164–165). 
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Appendix B Tonnage of Bombs Dropped on all Enemy Targets  
Year Tonnage bombs dropped 
(RAF Bomber Command) 
Tonnage bombs dropped 
(US Eighth Air Force) 
1939 31 – 
1940 13,033 – 
1941 31,704 – 
1942 45,561 1,561 
1943 157,457 44,185 
1944 525,518 389,119 
1945 181,740 188,573 
Total 955,044 623,438 
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